Tripolarity – or Bipolar Plus One? Europe’s Last Good Chance to Lead Innovation

“If you are not at the frontier of tech, you’re not sovereign anymore.” It was a strong statement made by Nobel Laureate Jean Tirole and set the stage for an energetic and unsentimental panel.

Research and Innovation in a Tripolar World moderated by Maria Leptin of the European Research Council featured heavyweight voices — former U.S. Energy Secretary Steven Chu, economist Mario Draghi, Infineon executive Thomas Schafbauer, and Tirole himself. Each participant came with their own diverse perspective, blending in science, finance, and innovation.

The envisioned tripolar geopolitical system has the US, China, and the European Union as the major players on the global economic, political, and innovation scenes. But the conversation quickly edged toward a tougher framing: Is this world actually bipolar—United States and China—plus one? In other words, is Europe the “plus one,” a consequential actor but not one of the two gravitational centers of tech and industry? That’s a big concern, and the panelists didn’t dance around it.

The F Word: Fragmentation

When the conversation turned to Europe’s innovation landscape, one word kept resurfacing with a sense of exasperation: fragmentation. The US and China are both a single country; the EU is a bloc of countries. But it’s not just this intrinsic geographical difference. For panelists from both policy and industry, the continent’s chronic tendency to spread its resources thinly stood out as one of its most pressing obstacles.

In AI, which is arguably the “hottest” innovation topic at the moment, the race is very top-heavy. It seems that only the world’s leading few companies and groups can sustain progress. Meanwhile, Europe is left behind.

“If you ask me about AI… I think the AI train for Europe has left the station. It is the US and China now competing on large language models mostly,” Schafbauer argued. He says that rather than propping up dozens of small initiatives, Europe should concentrate its bets. He gave the example of quantum computing centers. Germany has several, and this fragments resources and slows down competition. “I’m sure there will be only one or two [quantum centers], which really will be the top notch,” he mentioned

Former Italian prime minister and president of the European Central Bank Mario Draghi echoed this concern. He described fragmentation as both a political reflex and a structural flaw. Europe spends roughly the same share of GDP on research as the United States, he noted, but achieves less impact because the money is diluted across layers of EU programs, national agencies, and duplicative institutions.

“Part of this has to do with this idea that you have to give a little bit to everybody, which is exactly what you should not do to get to disruptive innovation,” he said. The result, according to Draghi, is a research landscape full of middling centers, but few world-leading institutions.

The problem, Maria Leptin added, is not just about money but also about scale. Where the United States can sustain three major telecommunications giants across the entire country, Europe has three in each member state, leaving them too small to finance the kind of bold research investments disruptive technologies demand. This type of problem will be hard to overcome, as each country will want to hold on to its own structure; but there are plenty of fragmentation aspects that can be overcome at the European level.

Schafbauer suggested Europe (and every actor who wants to be a geopolitical power) should focus more intensely on the domains where they are already doing well. The panel gave the example of Taiwan, which is relatively small but has focused intensely on semiconductors and has become the world leader in this key field.

Work Harder – and Smarter

Nobel Laureate Steven Chu, who served as U.S. Secretary of Energy under President Barack Obama, pointed to a different problem: hunger.

Chu painted a stark contrast between the hunger he once saw in China’s workforce and the complacency creeping into Europe and the United States. He described phoning suppliers in China who answered at midnight, hungry for the business. He contrasted that with American complacency—then asked whether Europe had the same problem or may even a worse one.

But it’s not just the work hours, the panel argued. Countries like Bangladesh or Mexico rank consistently among the highest weekly work load, but this doesn’t necessarily translate into economic progress. In fact, the data suggests that countries tend to work less hours as they become richer.

Instead, it’s more about how you work; it’s about the mission culture that Europe seems to have lost along the way. It’s not for economists to decide whether people want to work 20, 40, or 80 hours a week, Tirole argues. That’s a social choice. But if Europe, or any other country or bloc becomes complacent, they will risk losing their very sovereignty.

The challenge lies in working both harder and smarter – cultivating the urgency of “lean and hungry” innovators, while directing effort into the right clusters and fields where Europe can realistically lead.

Pick Your Battles and Commit

There was notably little talk about China. Part of the reason is structural: China’s research and innovation system is far less transparent than that of the U.S. or Europe, making meaningful comparisons difficult. As Mario Draghi put it, “The whole philosophy of how research is directed in China is different”. But the omission also reflects how obvious China’s strengths have become. Its scale, speed, and hunger are no longer in question.

In the case of the US, the panel chose to mostly sidetrack recent events and focus on the classical advantages of the US: a small number of elite institutions and companies that dominate globally (Stanford, MIT, Google, Microsoft, etc.), concentrating resources rather than fragmenting them. The US is still undoubtedly the leading innovation pole of the world.

Yet its advantage is shrinking fast. Chu described U.S. innovators as once restless and ambitious, willing to take big risks; 80% of total research expenditure in the US is private money, compared to only 20% in Europe. Now, the US is also showing signs of self-isolation and complacency, while China’s approach to first build the same thing cheaper and then innovate on that is paying great dividends. As for Europe, it has the potential to become a true pole, but it needs to act soon and pick up its battles.

For Schafbauer, the key approach was focus. Europe should not try to chase the U.S. and China in every technology but rather invest heavily in areas where it already has comparative strengths. Europe is already indispensable in power semiconductors and energy efficiency, it has credible shots in quantum sensing and specialized hardware; and world-class biology and materials science. Build from those strengths and use public money to de-risk early exploration, then try to get private capital to support further innovation.

Jean Tirole emphasized the need for institutions that protect science from political or commercial capture, while still fostering competition. This approach doesn’t require Europe to abandon its values. Europeans care deeply, and rightly, about privacy, environmental impacts, labor standards, and human rights. The panel didn’t argue against any of that; in fact, that could be Europe’s strength. What the panel argued for was better pacing, unity, and streamlining regulation. Europe tends to be extremely cautious when it comes to regulation, and this is often extremely inefficient.

Ultimately, the panel agreed on one central point: innovation is not optional. “It’s very hard to get any sustained increase in purchasing power without innovation,” Jean Tirole reminded the audience. Without new ideas, economies stagnate and living standards eventually erode.

But beyond economics, the panelists underscored a darker, more urgent reason why innovation matters: security. In a world reshaped by social media, artificial intelligence, and drones, the meaning of sovereignty has shifted. Nations that fall behind in disruptive technologies risk not only their prosperity but also their ability to defend themselves and safeguard democratic values.

Europe’s dilemma, then, is not whether to innovate, but how. If it overcome fragmentation, channel resources and foster the urgency of a “lean and hungry” innovation culture, it will firmly establish itself a key player in the tripolar world. In this modern world, innovation is not just an economic choice; it is the very price of independence.